TAKING AUSTERITY TO THE STREETS: FIGHTING AUSTERITY MEASURES OR AUSTERITY STATES [*]

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We present data on eighteen demonstrations against austerity politics. A distinction is made between demonstrations against the austerity measures governments are taking (11) and demonstrations against the governments that are taking these measures (7). In total, 3434 demonstrators completed a survey questionnaire inquiring about demographic characteristics, social and political embeddedness, mobilization channels, satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country, identification and motivation. We propose a theoretical framework for the comparison of participants in the two types of demonstrations. Employing anovas, manovas, and logistic regression analyses hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework are tested. With a proportion of correct classifications of 75.6% our model was able to satisfactorily account for the differences between the two types of demonstrations.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, many European governments embraced austerity politics in an attempt to master the financial crisis. However, they failed to persuade many citizens, as numerous people did not want an emaciated austerity state (Offe 2013). Relatedly, they did not want to pay for the failures of capitalism. A "movement of crisis" (Kerbo 1982) swept across Europe. Consequentially, we have witnessed over the last decade a dramatic rise in the number of street demonstrations, as citizens took to the streets to communicate their indignation, anger, or worry about the performance of their politicians (Kern, Marien, and Hooghe 2014; Likki 2014; McAdam, Simpson, Weffer, and MacIndoe 2005; Rüdig and Karyotis. 2013b). People lamented that, rather than protecting them from the economic recession, politicians were shifting the burden of the crisis to the people.

As one would imagine, people differed in the way they responded to the adverse circumstances (Wright 2001). Many never responded, but those who did took diverging routes. Some demonstrated against a specific austerity measure that affected them personally, as when students rejected an increase in tuition fees or when public health workers fought budget cuts on health care. For others, the financial/economic crisis turned into a political one. They demonstrated against the governments that took austerity measures, pointing to the political mismanagement of the crisis and questioning the government's legitimacy and its commitment to democracy. Examples include Occupy London, Occupy Amsterdam, and May 15 in Spain, when protesters claimed that the power should be taken from corrupt and incompetent politicians and given to the people. "We are the 99%*"* challenges politicians to listen to the people and to take their claims seriously. "We are the people that politicians claim to represent, but we do not feel represented or listened to," people seem to say. Usually, studies of demonstrations compare participants with nonparticipants, meaning scholars generally know how participants differ from nonparticipants, but this comparison overlooks how participants in street demonstrations are a mixed bag of people (Verhulst 2011).

This article focuses on participants in demonstrations reacting to austerity politics. We compare demonstrations against the measures governments take, which we call particularistic demonstrations, with demonstrations against the governments themselves, or universalistic

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demonstrations (Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977, Verhulst 2011). Scholars have argued that the two types of demonstrations are fundamentally different, having different motives, employing disparate mobilization mechanisms, and bringing divergent crowds into the streets (Anduiza, Cristancho and Sabucedo 2012a, 2012b; Likki 2014; Milkman, Luce and Lewis 2013; Rüdig and Karyotis 2013a). However, these theorized differences have not been tested systematically. Particularistic demonstrations attract people affected by the austerity measures. Usually, these demonstrations are staged by interest organizations such as labor unions. Obviously, these organizations play a central role in staging the protest event. We hypothesize that the universalistic demonstrations against the austerity state are fundamentally different than demonstrations against austerity measures. The crowds populating anti-state demonstrations are more diffuse, much more diverse, but above all rallying behind more fundamental claims and broader grievances. People are upset about how they are governed, and the financial crisis made their grievances more salient. They are the governed who rise against their government. Unlike demonstrators against austerity measures, demonstrators against the austerity states question the legitimacy of the government. Although we focus here on austerity politics, the particularistic-universalistic distinction applies more generally to protests against measures authorities take versus protests against the authorities taking those measures.

We propose a theoretical framework for comparing participants in these two types of demonstrations. We expect that these types of demonstrations attract different people, thus bringing separate crowds into the streets (who?), for different reasons (why?), and mobilized in a different way (how?). Research questions like these require comparative studies of participants in the two types of demonstrations, but most studies of protest events are either single case studies or global surveys Single case studies are not comparative by design, while global surveys do not collect data regarding participation in individual demonstrations.

The *Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation (the CCC project)* offers a dataset of over 15,000 individuals participating in a variety of street demonstrations, thus allowing us to address such comparative puzzles. Between 2009 and 2013 we surveyed citizens who populated street demonstrations in eight European countries, building a unique dataset of over 80 demonstrations. Some were ritual parades such as Pride events, women's marches, or May Day parades. Others were typical of new social movement events addressing such issues as anti-nuclear energy, anti-fascism, peace, or anti-racism. For this paper we are especially interested in comparing anti-austerity demonstration directed at austerity measures to those directed at the governments imposing such measures. How are they different in terms of gender, age, education, and employment status? Are they socially and politically embedded in different ways? Are they differentially mobilized? Does their evaluation of how democracy works in their country vary? Does their motivation to participate diverge?

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Participation in protest events is determined by supply factors, among others. One such supply factor is the configuration of organizers. Following Marije Boekkooi, Bert Klandermans, and Jacquelien van Stekelenburg (2011), we hold that the specific configuration of organizers influences the composition of the crowds in the street. Demonstrations against austerity measures are similar to traditional *"*bread and butter*"* protests staged by formal interest organizations such as labor unions or student associations (Verhulst 2011). Verhulst characterizes such protests as particularistic. People who feel that their interests are threatened take to the streets to defend their rights and to fight against the decline of their situation. Members of these organizations more likely encounter mobilization attempts. Also, as these organizations have contentious histories, their members are more likely experienced demonstrators (Beyeler and Kriese 2005; Rüdig and Karyotis 2013a; Verhulst 2011). On the other hand, demonstrations against the austerity state, are what Milkman and Shalev (2014) named occupy-type protests. These protests are about dashed hopes and uncertain futures. People who believe that the state itself fails to protect its citizens occupy public space to express their indignation. Anti-state demonstrations

are more inclusive and diverse, rooted in loosely coupled networks with weak collective identities and a limited capacity for coordinated action (Anduiza et al. 2012a; Beyeler and Kriesi 2005; Rüdig and Karyotis 2013a; Rüdig and Karyotis 2013b; Verhulst 2011). Verhulst characterizes these protests as universalistic, that is, addressing issues that concern whole populations or large segments of a population and involving grievances with moral, cultural, and lifestyle issues (de Moor 2016). Hence, the two types of demonstrations evolve from a different supply of protesters. Both managed to bring substantial numbers into action. We presume that such variation in supply factors reflects in who is taking part, how participants are mobilized, and why they are protesting.

Who is Taking Part? The Demographics of Contention

We expect to replicate the findings reported in the literature.[1] Such a replication would confirm the validity of our data. We presume that participants in demonstrations against the austerity state are usually part of the precariat (Jiménez 2013; Standing 2011), meaning they are younger, more highly educated, and in a more precarious employment status than participants in demonstrations against austerity measures. No consistent findings were reported regarding gender, which raises questions about what the gender composition of the two crowds will be.

How Are the Demonstrators Socially and Politically Embedded? The Networks of Contention

A basic factor in the explanation of protest participation is social and political embeddedness. How are people embedded in the formal and informal, social and political networks of their society? Anti-austerity demonstrations presumably build on more formal interest organizations, and we expect participants in these demonstrations more than participants in anti-state demonstrations to be embedded in the networks of the organizers and the formal organizational fields of their society. In contrast, we expect participants in demonstrations against the austerity state,to be less embedded in formal organizations and more in loosely coupled networks (Rüdig and Karyotis 2013a, 2013b). As for political embeddedness, we expect both types of demonstrators to be leaning toward the left (Hutter 2014). As their grievances are more fundamental, we expect participants in anti-state demonstrations to be more politicized. Therefore, we expect them to engage more often in political activities. As they espouse more fundamental objections to the austerity state, we expect them to be more involved in political debates as well (Rüdig and Karyotis 2013a, 2013b). In our study of Greek anti-austerity demonstrations, we found that close to a quarter of the demonstrators in Greece were participating for the first time in a street demonstration (2013a). We called those participants "apprentice demonstrators." Likewise, we expect more first-timers for the anti-state demonstrators than for the anti-measures demonstrators, because we assume that the latters' embeddedness in traditional interest organizations may have led them to protest in the streets before. As anti-measures demonstrators are older than anti-state demonstrators, this might in part also be an age-effect.

How Were the Demonstrators Mobilized? Collective versus Connective Action.

The occupy-type demonstrations that characterize our anti-state demonstrations are frequently organized as Facebook events (Anduiza et al. 2012a; Anduiza et al. 2012b; Langman 2013). Bennet and Segerberg (2012) make a distinction between collective and connective action, referring respectively to actions that are mobilized via organizational networks and to actions that are mobilized via the Internet (using Facebook, Twitter, and the like), largely without organizations (see also Klandermans, van Stekelenburg, Damen, van Troost, and van Leeuwen 2014; Walgrave and Wouters 2014). Demonstrations opposing the austerity state are examples of occupy-type demonstrations. Participants in this type of demonstration are less embedded in formal organizational networks. Therefore, we expect them to be more likely mobilized with the virtual networks potential participants are embedded in rather than organizations, while on the

other hand, anti-measures demonstrators are more likely mobilized through the traditional organizational networks in which they are embedded.

Why Did People Take to the Streets? Confronting Austerity Measures or Austerity States

What motivates people to participate in a demonstration, and how does that motivation differ for the two types of events analyzed here? In an attempt to further specify the dynamics of demand, van Stekelenburg (2006; also Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans and Van Dijk 2011) proposed a model integrating various approaches in the social psychological literature (Duncan 2012; Simon, Loewy, Stürmer, Weber, Freytag, Habig, Kampmeier, and Spahlinger 1998; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach 2004).

At the root of protest events lay shared grievances (Rucht and Neidhardt 2002). The more people are aggrieved about some state of affairs, the stronger their demand for protest. A distinguishing grievance between anti-measure demonstrators and anti-state demonstrators is people's dissatisfaction with democracy in their country. Employing European Social Survey data, Braun and Hutter (2014) show that citizens who distrust representative political institutions are more likely to take part in nonelectoral forms of political participation such as street demonstrations (see also Gaidyte, Muis, and Klandermans 2015). Also using ESS-data, Dalton et al. (2009) show that dissatisfaction with the way democracy functions in their country prepares people more for participation in collective action. In our comparison between anti-measures and anti-state demonstrators, we presume that dissatisfaction with the way democracy works is stronger in demonstrations against the austerity state than in demonstration against specific austerity measures, as the former are upset about the way politics is done in their country.

A central mechanism in van Stekelenburg's model is identification. In order to develop shared grievances and to act collectively, a collective identity must develop (Duncan 2012; Reger, Myers, and Einwohner 2008; Stryker, Owens, and White 2000). Demonstrations opposing austerity measures are examples of single-identity protests. A single-identity protest mobilizes in response to measures that affect a specific group of citizens (i.e., workers, females, students, pensioners). The austerity measures themselves define a collective identity, as identity politics breeds politicized identities (Klandermans 2014; Verhulst 2011) even more so if identity organizations like unions, student groups, or women's organizations are staging the event, which is typically the case for anti-measures demonstrations.

Demonstrations against the austerity state, on the other hand, are instances of multiple identity protests that refer to broadly defined social categories (e.g., Spanish citizens opposing capitalism, or Italians opposing Berlusconi). Mobilization campaigns for these events must not only mobilize people but must also forge collective identities. As mentioned, we expect that participants in anti-measure demonstrations are more likely to be embedded in identity organizations such as labor unions and student associations, for example. Therefore, we expect to find higher levels of identification with these organizers and with the other participants among the anti-measures demonstrators than among the anti-state demonstrators.

Shared grievances are at the root of politicized collective identities (Simon and Klandermans 2001). As anti-measures demonstrators are protesting against the same concrete austerity measures, we expect them to have a stronger sense of shared grievances. We assume that this will translate into stronger identification with other participants. The awareness that interests and/or principles of a group people identify with are violated are turned into motivation to participate in collective action by framing procsess (Snow and Benford 2000; Snow, Burke, Worden, and Benford 1986). We assume that this motivation can be instrumental and/or expressive (van Stekelenburg et al. 2011). Instrumental motives are based on the expectation that participation may help to redress the grievances, and people participate to defend their interests. Expressive motives, on the other hand, strive to express people's indignation and to raise public awareness. Both types of motivations feed into readiness to participate. If people develop a strong readiness to participate, an appealing supply of protest suffices to bring people into the streets. Participants in anti-austerity demonstrations share indignation about austerity

politics. In our view, particularistic demonstrations against austerity measures are collective actions to defend the interests of specific groups, while universalistic demonstrations against the austerity state are staged to appeal to more broadly defined protest potentials. Therefore, we expect anti-measures demonstrators to be pushed by instrumental motives rather than expressive ones and anti-state demonstrators by expressive motives rather than instrumental ones.

We expect participants in universalistic demonstrations against the austerity state, compared to participants in particularistic demonstrations against austerity measures, (1) to be younger, more highly educated, and in more precarious employment statuses; (2) to be less embedded in organizer networks and formal organizational fields and more embedded in loosely coupled social networks; (3) to be equally leaning to the political left; (4) to engage more in political activities and debates; (5) to be more often mobilized without organizations; (6) to identify less with the organizers and the other participants; (7) to be more dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their country; (8) to be more expressively motivated than instrumentally.

METHODS

The results come from data collected for a study of street demonstrations (the CCC study).[1] We selected demonstrations covered between November 2009 and November 2012 that related to austerity politics or to the way governments handled the financial crisis. Eighteen demonstrations in four countries (Belgium, UK, Spain, and Italy) qualified[2]. Eleven clearly aimed at specific austerity measures. Table 1 lists these protests and their main slogans. The remaining seven demonstrations addressed the quality of the government in the light of the financial crisis. Table 2 presents these seven demonstrations together with their main slogans.

Table 1. Anti-Austerity Measures Protests

Protests	Main Slogans
4. March for Work, Brussels, Belgium, Jan. 29, 2010	More jobs for young people and the unemployed; no more state aid to companies without conditions on the retention and creation of jobs.
18. Against new labor law, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, June 30, 2010	Against government cutting measures; show my rejection of the lowering of dismissal, Show my rejection of welfare cuts
20. No to Austerity, Brussels, Belgium, Sept. 29, 2010	Protest economic crisis; fixing the crisis must be paid for by the banks, not workers; the government should invest in green and renewable energy
22. Against Labor Law, Madrid, Spain Sept 29, 2010	Against government-cutting measures; against government's labor reform; fixing the crisis must be paid for by the banks and corporations, not workers
25. Fund Our Future: Stop Education Cuts, UK, November 10, 2010	The cuts in spending on higher education; defend students' and university staff's rights; secure accessible higher education for future generations
27. 2nd Student National Demonstration, London, UK, Dec. 9, 2010	Protest spending cuts in higher education; defend students' and university staff's rights; secure accessible higher education for future generations
36. TUC's March for Alternative, London, UK, March 26, 2011	Jobs, growth, justice; give a national voice to all affected by public services spending cuts; we reject that there is no alternative to spending cuts.
41. General Strike, Florence, Italy, May 6, 2011	Against government socioeconomic policies; in favor of workers rights and social justice
42. Nonprofit Demonstration, Brussels, Belgium, Mar. 29, 2011	The government must urgently agree with the nonprofit sector on a new social plan; wage and work conditions in the nonprofit sector have to rise
52. Defend Our Rights, Vigo, Spain, May 1, 2011	For employment reforms, not capital; protest employment insecurity and welfare cuts; show rejection of labor reform and the welfare cuts
55. We have alternatives, Brussels, Belgium, Dec. 2, 2011	Current economic problems, Eliminating the public deficit has to be done by raising new revenues, not by austerity measures; the automatic indexing of wages and social allocations has to be preserved

Table 2. Anti-Austerity State Protests

Protests	Main Slogans
7. Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis and War, Barcelona, Spain, Jan., 28, 2010	Unemployment and precariousness; job and wealth apportionment; less work so we can all work; stable jobs with no precarious conditions and a minimum monthly wage
11. Take Back Parliament, London, United Kingdom, May 15, 2010	Unfair voting system; a fair voting system so Parliament properly represents the British people; a proportional electoral system that ties a party's share of seats to its share of votes across the country
37. Not in Our Name, Brussels, Belgium, May 7, 2011	It is necessary to secure solidarity between both parts of the country; politicians negotiating unity for the country must mitigate their points of view.
51. Real Democracy Now! Madrid, Spain, May 15, 2011	Empowering citizens in decision-making policies; require a new policy that reflects the popular interest and not that of a minority. We are not commodities in the hands of politicians and bankers!
56. Occupy London, London, UK, Nov. 12, 2011	Unsustainable social system and the lack of social justice, Achieving social justice and real democracy. A future free from austerity measures
77. No Monti Day, Rome, Italy, Oct. 27, 2012	Protest against austerity measures put forth by the Monti government; for another Europe
79. Joining forces for another Europe, Florence, Italy, Nov. 10, 2012	Building another Europe from below; joining social forces at a European level to the crisis and the policies imposed by the EU institutions and the ECB; creating alliances to build a social Europe, the European citizen

Sampling Demonstrations

At the start of the project, we did not know what to expect in terms of demonstrations. Between 2009 and 2012, each national team of researchers was to study between eight and twelve demonstrations with at least 3,000 participants. Naturally, our sample of demonstrations is not a random sample. In some countries we covered nearly all demonstrations that occurred during our period of fieldwork, while in other countries we had a convenience sample of the demonstrations staged. On the whole, we contend that our eighteen demonstrations provide a realistic picture of the anti-austerity demonstrations in those days.

Collecting Data and Sampling Participants

The protest surveys employed printed questionnaires. (We handed out 500-1000 at the demonstration with prepaid envelopes for returning completed questionnaires to the university. In order to control for response biases, we also conducted short (2-3 minutes) interviews with a subsample of the respondents (n = 100-200) at the demonstrations using questions identical to those in the printed questionnaire. For the face-to-face interviews, The refusal rate was low (on average ten percent). By comparing the answers in the face-to-face interviews with those given on the questionnaires, and by comparing the face-to-face interviews of those who returned their questionnaire with the interviews of those who did not, we can make fairly accurate estimates of the response bias. In total 3,434 participants returned the questionnaires distributed during the demonstration (1,974 from measures-demonstrations and 1,460 from state-demonstrations). The response rates varied between fourteen and fifty-one percent between demonstrations, with an average of twenty-seven percent. Comparing those who did and did not return the questionnaire revealed that those who did return it were on average somewhat older and more highly educated than those who did not. The analyses we conducted to assess whether the nonresponse could have resulted in biased findings and conclusions did not reveal any deviating outcomes.

We designed a sampling strategy such that each participant had the same likelihood of being selected. Although circumstances inevitably necessitate variation, we aimed to keep sampling procedures as identical as possible across demonstrations. A team covers each

demonstration, consisting of a fieldwork coordinator, three or four pointers, and twelve to fifteen interviewers. Each pointer works with a team of four to five interviewers. The pointers select the interviewees, while interviewers conduct the interviews and hand out the questionnaires. Separating these two roles appeared to be crucial in preventing sampling biases (Walgrave, Wouters, and Ketelaars 2012). As interviewers tend to select people they believe to be willing to cooperate, they end up producing biased samples. The fieldwork coordinator oversees the employment of the pointer-interviewer teams. At the start of the event the coordinator makes an estimate of the number of participants. This defines the rate at which interviewers approach people to ask for interviews and to hand out questionnaires. In demonstrations that move through the streets, teams start at different points of the procession and work towards each other, approaching every Nth person in every Nth row. At demonstrations that stay in the same area, the space is divided into smaller areas; in each area a pointer considers the density of the crowd when selecting interviewees. We believe this sampling method leads to a representative sample of the demonstrators present.

Measures

All questionnaires and procedures are standardized. Identical questions and indicators (translated and back-translated) are employed in each country and for each demonstration. For our demographic measures, we ask about sex, age, education, and employment status. To measure social embeddedness, we asked participants in how many different organizations they had actively participated during the last twelve months (none, one, two or three, more than three). In addition, we asked each person if they were a member of one of the organizations staging the demonstration.

For political embeddedness, we used the classical "left-right self-placement" scale (0 = left, 10 = right). Furthermore, respondents received a list of nine different activities (ranging from contacting a politician to using violence) and were asked to mark if they had engaged in any such activities. For the current analyses, we counted how many different activities our respondents checked (ranging from zero to nine). Moreover, we asked, "How many times has [someone] taken part in a demonstration in the past twelve months?" (never, 1-5, 6-10, 11-20, more than 20). Finally, we assessed "How often does [respondent] discuss politics with their friends, relatives or fellow workers" (never, rarely, sometimes, fairly often, very often).

To capture satisfaction with democracy, we adopted the following question from the European Social Survey: "In general, how satisfied are you with the functioning of democracy in your country?" Answers ranged from zero (very dissatisfied) to ten (very satisfied).

We also distinguished between identification "with any organization staging the demonstration" and identification "with the other people present at the demonstration" (not at all, not very much, somewhat, quite, very much). The two forms of identification correlated (.48), but because the pattern of correlations of these two with other variables was significantly different. we kept them separate. Finally, in order to assess what motivated the participants to take part, we asked them to agree or disagree with various reasons to participate. We offered them two reasons related to instrumental motivation ("defend my interest" and "pressure politicians") and two reasons reflecting expressive motivation ("express my view" and "raise public awareness"), with participants indicating if they strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree. We collapsed the four into a measure of instrumental and a measure of expressive motives (each ranging from 2 "not at all motivated" to 10 "very much motivated").

Data Processing

We assessed the characteristics of the participants in the two types of demonstrations by means of crosstabulation and one-way anovas and manovas with type of demonstration as factor and demographics, social and political embeddedness, mobilization channels, identification, motivation, and emotions and (dis)satisfaction with the political system as the

dependent variables. We included independent variables group-wise in the anovas and manovas, in order to limit the loss of cases due to missing values. Next, we conducted a logistic regression analysis with the type of demonstration as the dependent variable and demographics, social and political embeddedness, identification, (dis)satisfaction with the political system, and motivation as the independent variables.

RESULTS

On the whole, as predicted, the first type of demonstration relates to concrete austerity measures while the second refers to the general working of politics, including austerity politics. The former were frequently organized by labor unions, whereas the latter were staged by loose coalitions. Table 3 provides the country breakdowns. In the remainder of the article we discuss and present data on the following five different matters and test whether the participants in the two types of demonstrations differ in terms of (1) democratic characterstics; (2) embeddedess in social and political networks; (3) mobilization trajectories; (dis)satisfaction with democracy, and (5) motivation to take to the streets.

Table 3. Respondents and Type of Demonstrations by Country: Number of Participants/Number of Demonstration

	Anti-austerity Measures	Anti-austerity State	Total
United Kingdom	456/3	494/2	950/5
Belgium	639/4	202/1	841/5
Spain	644/3	427/2	1071/15
Italy	235/1	337/2	572/3
Total	1974/11	1460/7	3434/18

Demographic Characteristics

We begin our comparison with the demographic characteristics of the participants: gender, employment status, age, and education (table 4). Available evidence made us expect that participants in demonstrations against the austerity state are in a more precarious employment status, younger, and more highly educated than participants in demonstrations against austerity measures. This is what our data confirm, albeit in varying degree.

Table 4. Demographic Characteristics

	Anti-austerity Measures	Anti-austerity State	Significance
Female	45.3%	44.7%	χ^2 (1)=0.12^{ns}
Employment status:			
Full-time	57.9%	40.1%	χ^2 (1)=106.6***
Part-time	13.8%	9.7%	χ^2 (1)=13.33***
Self-employed	3.0%	10.1%	χ^2 (1) =73.5***
Unemployed	5.3%	9.4%	χ^2 (1)=21.7**
Student	9.9%	13.6%	χ^2 (1)=11.3***
Year born	1967 (13.5)	1968 (15.7)	F(2)=6,6**
Education (tertiary and higher)	46.9%	71.1%	χ^2 (7)=222.97***
N	1974	1460	

We had no expectations with regard to gender, as the literature is inconsistent. In our sample we found no significant difference in the gender composition of the two types of demonstrations. We note that anti-state demonstrators appear to have a more precarious employment status. More of them are self-employed, unemployed, or students facing an uncertain future. Two-fifths have a full-time job compared to three-fifths of anti-measures demonstrators. Participants in anti-state demonstrations are somewhat younger than those in demonstrations opposing austerity measures, although the differences are small. Anti-state demonstrators are much more highly educated than anti-measures demonstrators. In the literature the term "precariat" (*precariado*) was coined to designate this new class of people in precarious socioeconomic circumstances: highly educated, but with an uncertain future (Standing 2011). Demonstrations against the austerity state more often drew their participants from this new class.

Social and Political Embeddedness

What about embeddedness in social and political spaces (table 5)? How are the two types of demonstrators embedded in the social and political networks of their society?

As expected, participants in anti-state demonstrations appear to be less involved in the multiorganizational fields in their societies than participants in anti-measures demonstrations. Rather than being underrepresented in specific types of organizations, they are consistently less involved across the spectrum of organizations in Western societies. We found large differences regarding participants' affiliation to the organizers. Almost three quarters of the anti-measures demonstrators were members of at least of the organizations that staged the demonstration versus a quarter of the anti-state demonstrators.

Table 5. Social and Political Embeddedness: Mean and Std. Deviations and Cross-Tabulations

	Anti-austerity measures	**Anti-austerity state**	**Significance**
Involvement in org. fields (0 - >3)	2.36 (.95)	2.26 (1.03)	F(1)=9.09***
Affiliation to organizer	70.9%	25.2%	χ^2 (1)=659.39***
Left-right self-placement (0=left, 10=right)	2.52 (2.34)	2.29 (2.27)	F(1)=7.87**
Political activity (0-9)	3.95 (1.92)	4.27 (1.79)	F(1)=22.08***
Talking politics (1-5)	3.72 (.85)	3.94 (.80)	F(1)=52.24***
Novice demonstrator	12.4%	24.4%	χ^2 (4)=26.78***
N	1813	1325	

Participants in the two types of demonstrations differ in terms of political embeddedness as well. In terms of ideological self-placement, our evidence corroborated the general observation that participants in street demonstrations are leaning toward the political left (Hutter 2014), with austerity state demonstrators identifying as even more left-oriented than anti-measures demonstrators. As expected, anti-state demonstrators are politically more active than anti-measures demonstrators. Moreover, they talk more often about politics with friends, relatives, and colleagues than do the anti-measures demonstrators. They are thus more politicized than their counterparts and, interestingly, they are more engaged in politics despite lower levels of embeddedness in civil society. As expected, more participants in the anti-austerity state demonstrations took part for the first time in a street demonstration than did participants in anti-austerity measures demonstrations.

In general, it seems that the people demonstrating against the austerity state were less embedded in social networks but more embedded in political networks than those demonstrating against austerity measures. This finding runs counter to Putnam's (2000) assertion that lower social embeddedness results in less political activity.

Mobilization

Bennett and Segerberg's (2012) distinction between collective and connective action applies to the distinction between anti-measure and anti-state demonstrations. As mentioned, collective action refers to actions that are mobilized in a traditional manner via formal organizations, while connective action refers to actions that are mobilized without organizations via the Internet (Facebook, Twitter, and the like). We characterized demonstrations opposing austerity measures as collective action and demonstrations opposing the austerity state as connective action. On those grounds, we expected anti-state demonstrations to mobilize more often without organizations, using the virtual networks participants are embedded in to recruit people. On the other hand, we expected Demonstrations against austerity measures to more frequently employ formal organizations to mobilize participants. The small proportion of the participants in anti-state demonstrations who are members of any of the organizations that staged the demonstration makes us expect these demonstrations to be typical examples of connective action—mobilization without organization. The much larger proportion of anti-measures protesters affiliated with the organizers suggests that these demonstrations are examples of collective action—mobilization via traditional organizational networks.

Table 6. Communication Channels

	Anti-austerity measures	**Anti-austerity state**
Mass media		
Radio, television	25.6%	10.4%
Newspapers	26.7%	17.9%
Interpersonal networks		
Family	11.1%	11.5%
Acquaintances	20.3%	27.1%
Organizational networks		
Fellow members of an organization	48.5%	22.3%
An organization	33.8%	29.2%
Advertisements, flyers, posters	31.6%	16.6%
The Internet		
Social networks (facebook, twitter)	13.9%	38.7%
Online media	18.1%	39.0%
N	1974	1460

Note: As respondents could mention several options, percentages do not add up to 100%

Table 6 speaks to this matter. Participants in anti-state demonstrations learned relatively frequently about the demonstration via loosely coupled networks (acquaintances) and the Internet, while relatively large proportions of the participants in the anti-measures demonstrations learned about the demonstration via traditional organizational networks. In answer to the follow-up question asking which of those channels was the most important source of information, 30.1% of the participants in anti-state measures demonstrations mentioned organizations as compared to 62.2% of the participants in anti-measures demonstrations. Conversely, the Internet was the most important channel for 40.1% of the anti-state-participants compared to 10.1% of the anti-measures participants. Hence, in the context of anti-state demonstrations, social media are indeed far more important. Organizations still played a role for these demonstrations, albeit a far less prominent one compared to demonstrations against austerity measures. Indeed, mobilization for these demonstrations at least partially occurred without organizations.

Satisfaction with Democracy

In table 7 we present results regarding (dis)satisfaction with democracy. We hypothesized that anti-state demonstrations are more likely to attract people who are dissatisfied with the

Table 7. Satisfaction with Democracy: Means and Standard Deviation

	Anti-austerity measures	Anti-austerity state	Significance
Satisfaction (0-10)	4.1 (2.58)	2.8 (2.30)	F (1)=207.2***
N	1919	1415	

way democracy works in their country. We reasoned that more than demonstrations against austerity measures, demonstrations against austerity states are expressions of dissatisfaction with the way politics works in the participants' countries. Indeed, as expected, in response to the question how satisfied they are with the way democracy works in their country, participants in anti-state demonstrations appear more negative than participants in anti-measure demonstrations. Note, however, that on average the evaluation by both groups of demonstrators is rather negative (4.1 and 2.8, respectively, on a scale from 0 to 10).

Motivational Dynamics

Anti-austerity measures demonstrations were more often mobilized through organizations and anti-state demonstrations more often without organizations. Indeed, many participants in the former are members of the organizations that staged the demonstrations. Klandermans (2014) refers to membership of identity organizations as organized identities, which are not only easier to mobilize, but also more salient. Under such circumstances, we expected higher levels of identification with the organizers and the other participants among anti-measures demonstrators. Table 8 displays the relevant findings.

Table 8. Motivation to Action: Standardized Measures

	Anti-austerity measure	Anti-austerity state	Significance
Identification w/ organizers (1-5)	3.9 (1.05)	3.8 (1.01)	F(1)=5.80*
Identification w/ other participants (1-5)	4.2 (.78)	4.0 (.83)	F(1)=58.82***
Expressive motivation (2-10)	8.9 (1.22)	8.9 (1.20)	$F(1)=1.02^{ns}$
Instrumental motivation (2-10)	8.7 (1.41)	8.1 (1.69)	F(1)=117.00***
N	1781	1766	3547

Both types of demonstrators show higher levels of identification with other participants than with the organizers. Levels of identification were higher among anti-measures demonstrators In view of the degree of embeddedness of the anti-measures demonstrators this is what we expected.

In terms of the motivation to participate, we expected participants in demonstrations against austerity measures to be more instrumentally motivated, as they are on the streets to fight concrete austerity measures. Anti-austerity state demonstrations, on the other hand, we expected to be more expressively motivated. Table 8 reveals that anti-measures demonstrators are significantly more instrumentally motivated than anti-state demonstrators. Moreover, anti-state demonstrators are far more expressively motivated than instrumentally. However, in terms of expressive motivation, the two types of demonstrators are the same, which is not what we expected.

Classifying Demonstrators: Multivariate Analyses

Thus far, we have assessed whether participants in the two types of demonstrations differed in terms of demographics, social and political embeddedness, statisfaction with democracy, and motivation. We conducted cross-tabulations, anovas, and manovas with these

factors as dependent variables and type of demonstration as fixed factor. In this section, we will explore to what extent relations found in the previous analyses appear in multivariate analyses. More specifically, we assessed to what extent we can classify correctly in which demonstration individual demonstrators participated on the basis of the variables in the equation. We applied both discriminant analysis and logistic regression analysis, which produced similar outcomes.

Table 9. Austerity Measures Versus Austerity State: Stepwise Logistic Regression

	Correct Classifications	Nagelkerke's R Squared
Null-model	58.2%	-
Demographics	60.9%	.06
Social embeddedness	72.7%	.28
Political embeddedness	73.0%	.30
Satisfaction with democracy	73.5%	.34
Motivation	75.6%	.40

The fit measures of the logistic regression analyses summarized in table 9 are satisfactory. Whereas the a priori chance that individuals are classified correctly is 58.2 percent, based on the full-model 75.6 percent of the participants could be classified correctly, while Nagelkerke's R^2 = .40. The increases in correct classifications and R^2s indicate that net of the variables already in the equation, political embeddedness and satisfaction with democracy did not make much of a difference between the two types of demonstrations. However, the demographics, social embeddedness, and motivation each come with substantial jumps of the fit indicators, suggesting that the two groups of demonstrators are significantly different in terms of demographic characteristics, social embeddedness, and motivation to action.

The detailed results of the logistic regression analysis are presented in table 10, providing a picture of how the two kinds of demonstrators were different. As the anti-measures demon-

Table 10. Austerity Measures Versus Austerity State: Logistic Regression[a]

	B	Wald (df=1)
Demographics		
Sex (female = 2)	-.08	$.59^{ns}$
Year born	-.01	2.24^{ns}
Education	.13	15.80***
Social embeddedness		
Involvement in organizations	.03	$.20^{ns}$
Affiliation to organizers	-2.33	379.49***
Political embeddedness		
Left-right self-placement (0=left)	.04	3.36^{+}
Political behavior	.06	3.02^{+}
Talking politics	.24	13.45***
Satisfaction w/ democracy		
Satisfaction w/ democracy	-.22	102.65***
Motivation		
Identification w/ other participants	-.48	44.62***
Identification w/ organizers	.56	83.71***
Expressive motives	.14	9.02**
Instrumental motives	-.28	59.84***
N=3434		

Note: [a] For dependent variable, anti-austerity measures = 1, anti-austerity state = 2; Correct classifications 75.6%, Nagelkerke's R^2=.40;

strations are coded 1 and anti-state demonstrations 2, a positive B means that anti-state demonstrators score higher and the anti-measures demonstrators lower on the variable in point. Conversely, a negative B means that the anti-state demonstrators score lower and the anti-measures demonstrators higher on the variable in point.

Net of the other variables, level of education is the major demographic discriminator. Participants in demonstrations against austerity states are more highly educated than participants in demonstrations against austerity measures. Net of other factors, gender and age did not make a difference.

The starkest discriminator in this analysis appears to be membership in one of the organizations that staged the demonstration. The two types of participants are virtually each other's opposites in this respect. The vast majority of the anti-measures demonstrators are affiliated with the organizers, while conversely the vast majority of the anti-state demonstrators are unaffiliated with the organizers. The differences in social embeddedness observed in the manova do not appear here. As for the embeddedness in the organizational field, the two types of demonstrators are the same. As mentioned already, net of other factors, political embeddedness is of limited weight as a discriminator. Net of the other factors, anti-measures demonstrators are more left-leaning, while anti-state demonstrators are politically more active and talk more about politics, but the differences are small. In short, participants in the two types of demonstrations are equally politicized.

Satisfaction with the way democracy works in someone's country retained its original link with the type of demonstration. In line with the previously reported findings, satisfaction with democracy is lower among anti-state demonstrators. In fact, satisfaction with democracy is the second most important discriminating factor in this analysis.

Motivation remains an important factor discriminating between the two types of demonstrators. The findings regarding expressive and instrumental motivation corroborate our hypotheses and earlier findings: participants in anti-state demonstrations are more expressively motivated and less instrumentally motivated than participants in anti-measures demonstrations. Net of other factors, participants in anti-state demonstrations identify more with the organizers of the demonstration than do participants in anti-measures demonstrations, and less with the other participants than do anti-measures demonstrators.

Further analysis of identification patterns suggests a moderating role of membership of organizations that staged the demonstration (table 11). Among members of organizations that staged the demonstration, all identity scores were relatively high; among nonmembers, all identity scores were relatively low. Both members and nonmembers in anti-measures protests identify more with the other participants; however, participants in anti-state demonstrations identify more with the organizers if they are members of organizations that staged the demonstration and with the other participants than if they are not a member.

In sum, the two types of anti-austerity demonstrations appealed to different protest potentials and brought different crowds into the streets. Comparing participants in street demonstrations who protest against the austerity state to participants in demonstrations against

Table 11. Identification by Affiliation to Organizers and Type of Demonstration: Mean and Standard Deviations

	Member		**Nonmember**	
	Anti-measure	*Anti-state*	*Anti-measure*	*Anti-state*
Identification w/ organizers	4.18 (.86)	4.35 (.74)	3.17 (.112)	3.58 (1.01)
Identification w/ other participants	4.28 (.75)	4.11 (.77)	4.03 (.80)	3.91 (.84)
N	1299	336	517	933

Note: Identification with other participants: main effect affiliation to organizers, $F(1) = 47.22$, $p<.000$; main effect type of demonstration, $F(1) = 19.41$, $p<.000$; affiliation x demonstration, .691, ns. Identification with organizers: main effect affiliation to organizers, $F(1) = 521.35$, $p<.000$; main effect type of demonstration, $F(1) = 47.95$, $p<.000$; affiliation x demonstration, $F(1) = 9.58$**.

austerity measures, we find that the former are far less likely to be a member of an organization that staged the demonstration. Nonmembers identify much less with the organizers of the demonstration and the other participants. If we separate members and nonmembers, we find participants in anti-state demonstrations identifying more with the organizers and less with the other participants in both subsamples. Furthermore, and as expected, participants in anti-state demonstrations are less likely to be instrumentally motivated and more likely to be expressively motivated.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this article we reported the results of a study of anti-austerity protests, comparing street demonstrations against anti-austerity measures taken by the government with street demonstrations protesting the government taking these measures (Offe 2013). To fruitfully compare participants in the two types of demonstrations, we developed a theoretical framework based on the characterization of anti-measures demonstrations as particularistic and anti-state demonstrations as universalistic. We assumed that these two types of demonstrations attract different crowds. A basic factor differentiating the two crowds appeared to be their social embeddedness. Corroborating our theoretical framework, particularistic, anti-measure demonstrators are considerably more embedded in networks of the organizers than universalistic, anti-state demonstrators. This embeddedness had important consequences. In terms of mobilization dynamics, we used Bennett and Segerberg's (2012) distinction between collective and connective action to hypothesize that anti-measures demonstrations are more likely to employ traditional organizational networks, while anti-state demonstrations are more likely to mobilize without organizations. Our findings confirmed this hypothesis. Furthermore, we assumed that the disparate degree of social embeddedness would result in different levels of identification, which again was confirmed. Anti-measures demonstrations reveal higher levels of identification with the organizers and the other participants. Identification patterns appeared to be moderated by affiliation to the organizers. Members of organizations that staged the demonstration identified significantly more with the organizers and the other participants than did nonmembers, irrespective of the demonstration they in which they participated.

Like Verhulst (2011), we found that the motivational dynamics of particularistic and universalistic demonstrations diverge. Net of other factors, participants in anti-state demonstrations were more expressively than instrumentally motivated, while participants in anti-measures demonstrations were more instrumentally than expressively motivated. The claims of demonstrations against the austerity state are broadly framed in terms of blaming the state for its incapacity to deal with the financial crisis in a fair manner and challenging the legitimacy of the austerity state. Therefore, such demonstrations are especially appealing to citizens who feel that the state is violating their political values and principles. Demonstrations opposing specific austerity measures, however, forward much narrower claims. They want the austerity measures that affect their situation to be cancelled, be it budget cuts, pension decreases, or raised registration fees, among others. The demonstration provides a way to communicate those claims to the politicians. Obviously, these demonstrations appeal to those who are affected by the measures being protested. They are not challenging the legitimacy of the state; instead, they want the state to redress the austerity measures. The distinction between these two types of protest is akin to the classical distinction made by Turner and Killian (1987) between power- and value-oriented movements. Van Stekelenburg (2006; see also van Stekelenburg et al. 2011) shows that power-oriented movements tend to appeal to instrumental motives, while value-oriented movements appeal to expressive motives, a finding we also confirmed.

Clearly, the two types of demonstrations bring different crowds into the streets, which is especially interesting as both are reactions to austerity politics. Anti-state demonstrators were

much more highly educated than anti-measures demonstrators. Moreover, among the anti-state demonstrators, people occupied more precarious employment statuses. Indeed, a generation which in terms of education disposes of more resources than ever, is hit hard by the financial-economic crisis. More than anti-measures demonstrations, anti-state demonsrations were mobilizing the so-called precariat (Standing 2011).

In line with their lower levels of embeddedness in the organizers' networks, anti-state demonstrations more often than anti-measure demonstrations attract novices who are participating in a street demonstration for the first time in their lives. Compared to the "weathered demonstrators" who populate the anti-measures demonstrations, they are what Rüdig and Karyotis (2013a) call "apprentice demonstrators."

Anti-state demonstrators are more politicized than anti-measure demonstrators (Klandermans 2014). To be sure, each type of demonstrator is politically active, but participants in anti-state demonstrations engage in more political activities and discuss politics more frequently with their peers than participants in anti-measures demonstrations. In terms of political ideology, both types of demonstrator identify with the political left. In that sense our findings confirm Hutter's (2014) findings that movement politics is predominantly a leftist affair. Of the two types of demonstrators, anti-state demonstrators were significantly less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country.

Our findings clearly indicate the relevance of the distinction between collective and connective action (Bennett and Segerberg 2012). The qualification of a Facebook revolt is partially appropriate for anti-state protests. Nevertheless, mobilization without organization is too strong a statement. Obviously, a significant part of the mobilization process passed off via organizations also in the case of protest aiming at the austerity state.

Let us now return to the question of whether the two types of demonstration are fundamentally different. Our study shows that they bring different people into the streets; the participants are differentially embedded in society, mobilized in a different manner, and differentially motivated. Yet, as mentioned above, they are all members of the left-libertarian family (Della Porta and Rucht 1995; Hutter 2014). Anti-measures demonstrators are much more embedded in movement organizations, which in our cases were mostly unions. In their mobilization campaigns these organizations are primarily reaching out to their own members and appealing to instrumental motives more than expressive ones. The composition of the anti-state demonstrations is much more heterogeneous, as the networks they are building on are more diverse; the organizers appeal to expressive motives rather than instrumental ones. The combination of education, employment status, social and political embeddedness, collective and connective mobilization campaigns, dissatisfaction with democracy, identification, and motivation worked well in distinguishing between participants in the two types of demonstrations. The theory fit the data well, correctly classifying 75.6% of the cases. The composition of the crowds in the streets results from supply factors that are appealing to some people more than others. As we surveyed people in the act of protest, obviously, for these citizens the supply did fit a demand. Otherwise, they would not have taken part. Moreover, they were all demonstrations against austerity politics. Despite the commonalities, our study demonstrated that the people on the streets differed in a meaningful way, depending on whether people were fighting austerity measures or austerity states.

The anti-austerity demonstrations we studied were a response to the financial and economic crisis that hit the Western world. When crises evolve, affected organizational fields mobilize and thus become organizing fields. Depending on the characteristics of these fields, these fields vary in the campaigns they stage and the constituencies to which they appeal. In the campaigns we studied, different aspects of the crisis were emphasized. We compared campaigns that framed the crisis as a financial/economic one with campaigns that framed the crisis as a political one. The former type (reacting to a financial/economic crisis) does not question the legitimacy of the government but protests against a specific austerity measure. These demonstrations appeal to a particular constituency, and thus we labeled these particularistic demonstrations. The latter type of demonstrations (reacting to a political crisis)

questions the legitimacy of the government while appealing to a wide constituency. Therefore, we labeled these demonstrations universalistic demonstrations. We argued that the two types of demonstration are fundamentally different, bringing widely diverging crowds onto the street.

We theorized that the mobilizing fields differ for the two types of demonstrations. Borrowing from Bennett and Segerberg (2012), we made a distinction between connective action as evolving in "organizationally enabled networks" and collective action as evolving in "organizationally brokered networks" (p. 756). Depending on the structure of the mobilizing field, we expected the mobilization techniques to differ, and that is what we found.

We also observed that particularistic demonstrations evoke higher levels of identification than do universalistic ones. Furthermore, both types of demonstrations evoke higher levels of identification with the other participants than with the organizers.

Our study contributes a framework for the explanation of how specific demonstrations attract specific participants, with specific patterns of identification, specific motives, and with mobilization through different channels. Indeed, people were not distributed randomly between the two types of demonstrations, but through mechanisms that make some demonstrations more appealing to them than others. Hence, it is the organizing field and the way the crisis is framed in that field that determines who feels attracted, with what grievances the campaign resonates, and how the participants were mobilized for the two types of demonstrations.

NOTES

[1] Anduiza et al. 2012a; Langman 2013; Likki 2014; Milkman, Luce, and .Lewis 2013; Milkman and Shalev 2014; Rüdig and Karyotis 2013a; Rüdig and Karyotis 2013b; Tejerina and Perugorría 2013.

[2] See van Stekelenburg, Walgrave, Klandermans, and Verhulst (2012); Walgrave, Wouters, and Ketelaars (2016), and Saunders 2014 for more detailed descriptions of the project.

[3] We only selected countries where there were in the designated period both anti-measure and anti-state demonstration.

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